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Privacy Property, Information Costs, and
the Anticommons
by
EDWARD J. JANGER*

As Paul Schwartz and Joel Reidenberg have pointed out in their

treatise on data privacy law, the current law of privacy is a
hodgepodge of rights and remedies.' Some rights arise out of a
specific statute, others arise out of the general common law of torts
and contract. Each system for protecting privacy has its own
distinctive remedial scheme. Some rights are backed by public
enforcement alone, some by private rights of action, some by both.
Some come with compensatory damages, others with attorneys' fees,
punitive damages, or statutory damages. Even where a private right
of action exists, however, that right is often enforced by civil liability,
rather than property-based entitlements. In this essay, I will argue for

a switch to property-based protection of personal data, but my
principle task will be to take seriously (and propose techniques for
minimizing) the costs associated with a regime of information
property.
In an earlier article, I examined the enforcement of privacy rights

held by individuals against private sector actors and asked three
questions: (1) whether those rights should be cast in the form of
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Special thanks to Paul
Schwartz, Henry Smith, Edward Rubin, A. Douglas Melamed, Peter Swire, and my copanelists Joel Reidenberg, Ron Plesser, Susan Henrichsen, and Lisa Rosenthal, for
comments on an earlier draft. I also wish to thank Lynn LoPucki for disagreeing
forcefully with an earlier piece and forcing me to think more carefully about the costs of
protecting information privacy. I am indebted to Sandra Rampersaud, Matthew Cohen,
and Chris Christon for excellent research assistance and to the Dean's Research Fund of
the Brooklyn Law School for generous financial support of this project. Mistakes are, of
course, mine alone.
This paper was originally presented at Enforcing Privacy Rights, a symposium
sponsored by the Samuelson Law, Technology, and Public Policy Clinic at Boalt Hall
School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; the Institute for Law and Economic
Policy; and the Hastings Law Journal,November 15-16, 2002.
1. See generally PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY
LAW (1996 & Supp. 1998).
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"property"- or "liability"-based rules, (2) whether they should be
default rules (i.e., alienable) or mandatory rules (i.e., inalienable),
and (3) whether they should be cast as rules or standards In that
piece, I explained why I am concerned that the use of liability rules
may lead to underenforcement and underarticulation of privacy
norms; why I doubt that private contract is an appropriate device for
specifying duties with regard to non-public personal information; and
why, given the current unsettled state of consumer knowledge about
how information is used, unformed consumer expectations about
secondary use, and the rapid rate of technological change, I believe
that crystalline safe harbors for personal information transactions are
inappropriate
I therefore advocated a regime of "mandatory muddy property
rules" for information privacy to encourage the common law
development of data privacy norms. I will rehearse some of that
argument here, and take the discussion a step further.
That earlier piece began a dialogue with two distinct clusters of
property theorists
The first cluster I call the "norm-enforcing
property theorists."
They include (though they might not
characterize themselves as such) Lawrence Lessig,6 Lynn LoPucki ,
and myself.'
The second cluster-the "cost minimizers"-is
exemplified by the work of Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, 9

2. Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information
Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801, 1808 (2003).
3. Id. at 1809-17.
4. Id. at 1866-73.
5. Id. at 1801-02.
6. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 240-61 (2001).
7. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887,
1898-99 (1994) [hereinafter LoPucki, Creditor's Bargain]. I suspect that Professor
LoPucki would be surprised at finding himself on this list since he takes a very different
view of privacy rights than that articulated in this paper. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Did
Privacy Cause Identity Theft?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1277 (2003). However, there are strong
parallels between the arguments he makes in the torts context, those I make in the privacy
context, and those Lessig makes in the intellectual property context. The difference
between us turns not on property theory, but upon the norms we would choose to use
property law to enforce.
8. See Edward J. Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence
and Statutory Design, 43 ARIz. L. REV. 559, 584-86 (2001); Janger, supra note 2, at 1859;
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 600 (1988).
9. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardizationin the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill
& Smith, Numerus Clausus];Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract
Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 778 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith,
Property/ContractInterface].
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Michael Heller, 10 and Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman." For
these purposes, my earlier work falls into the norm-enforcing camp,
and it is from that perspective that I will take on the cost minimizers.
The dispute runs something like this: New forms of property are
being created by law, 2 contract,13 and even by technology' to help

order the new economy. The role of law in regulating these new
types of property is up for grabs, and raises a number of crucial
questions: Should new types of property be created? If so, what
institutions should create those property rights, and how should they

be defined?
On one end of the spectrum, Merrill and Smith argue
descriptively that property rights come in a limited number of

standardized forms, and prescriptively, that such standardized forms
help third parties to identify the bundle of rights held by the owner.'5
On the other hand, Lawrence Lessig, in the context of copyright,
Lynn LoPucki, in the context of tort law, and i, in the context of data
privacy, have argued that property rights can be shaped by social
policy concerns.' For Lessig, intellectual property carries with it both
a monopoly and a responsibility." As such, he would impose limits on
10. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1173-74 (1999) [hereinafter Heller, Boundaries]; Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621,
665-67 (1998) [hereinafter Heller, Tragedy].
11. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification:
The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 374
(2002).
12. The Digital Millenium Copyright Act extends the protection accorded to digital
information and brings new types of information within the scope of copyright protection.
See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). Also, privacy advocates have argued for
the propertization of non-public personal information. In Europe, this is already
happening as a result of the European Union's Privacy Directive. Council Directive 95/46,
1995 O.J. (L 281/31). In the United States, personal information is protected principally
by contract and tort law (and, as discussed below, by a number of statutes of narrow
application), but there are a number of legislative proposals on the horizon.
13. New forms of software licensing arrangements are a staple of the "new" economy.
14. As Lessig points out, even in the absence of governing law, technologies, such as

"trusted systems" can be used to prevent unauthorized access to intellectual property.
LAWRPNCE- LEssiG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CVRFRSPACE 129-30 (1999).

15. Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 9, at 8:
When property rights are created, third parties must expend time and resources
to determine the attributes of these rights, both to avoid violating them and to
acquire them from present holders. The existence of unusual property rights
increases the cost of processing information about all property rights. Those
creating or transferring idiosyncratic property rights cannot always be expected
to take these increases in measurement costs fully into account, making them a
true externality. Standardization of property rights reduces these measurement
costs.
16. See supra notes 6-8.
17. LESSIG, supranote 14, at 127.
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the scope of intellectual property rights to further the goals of
innovation inherent in the copyright and patent laws."' In my own
work, I have explored how "muddy property rules" can be used to
encourage the articulation of information privacy norms, while
crystalline rules can place too much faith in the market, particularly in
consumer contexts or where public goods are involved.' 9 Finally,
LoPucki has argued that tort claims should be given priority over
secured claims (in effect a superpriority lien), in order to encourage
debtors to make reasonable investments in safety, and to encourage
secured creditors to monitor that investment.'
The questions are
thus: (1) Should we respect the numerus clausus (the existing, limited
forms of property); and (2) should property rights be crystalline and
standardized to facilitate contracting, or should they be muddy and
laden with regulatory and/or normative content to encourage norm
articulation and enforcement?
While norm-enforcing property rights have important benefits,
they also impose costs" that should be taken seriously. In this Article,
I wish to explore these costs of muddy norm-laden property regimes
in the information privacy context, and to propose a number of
devices that may help capture the benefits, and reduce the costs of
muddy information property.
This paper will proceed in five brief steps. Part I will identify the
existing sources of privacy entitlements under current law, and the
applicable remedial schemes. In this Part, I will show that, while in

18. Id.
19. Janger, supra note 2, at 1815-17.
While my property-based approach to
information privacy and Lessig's approach to intellectual property are similar in structure,
we actually disagree over the proper approach to information privacy. Lessig advocates a
simple property regime for information privacy, LESSIG, supra note 14, at 161 ("A
property regime thus protects both those who value their privacy more than others and
those who value it less, by requiring that someone who wants to take a given resource
must ask. Such a regime gives us confidence that if a trade occurs, it will be at a price that
makes neither party worse off."), but a muddy one for intellectual property, id. at 134
("[T]he balance that intellectual property law traditionally strikes is between the
protections granted the author and the public use or access granted everyone else. The
aim is to give the author sufficient incentive to produce."), whereas I would advocate
muddy regimes for both.
20. LoPucki, Creditor's Bargain, supra note 7, at 1963 ("The priority of secured
creditors over involuntary unsecured creditors cannot be justified by any coherent theory

and should be abolished. Involuntary creditors should have priority over voluntary
creditors, whether secured or unsecured.").
21. Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 9, at 27-28:
[ilt is useful to distinguish three classes of individuals who might be affected by
the decision to create idiosyncratic property rights, or fancies .... First are the
originating parties, who are the participants to the transaction creating the
fancy.... Second are the potential successors in interest to the asset that is being
subjected to the fancy.... Finally, there are the other market participants....
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certain limited contexts, personal data is given property-like
protection, to the extent that broadly applicable private rights of
action exist to enforce privacy entitlements, they are enforced
through liability rather than property.22 In Part II, I will explore
certain costs and benefits associated with liability-based enforcement,
and suggest that propertization holds out important promise. In Part

III, I will merge the substance and remedy question somewhat,
arguing that it is a migtake to try to solve the "remedy" problem
without considering the "right" problem at the same time. If the goal
is to enforce a right or a norm that is well understood by parties with
equal bargaining power, then a crystalline property-based fully
alienable right might be appropriate. If the norm is well understood,
but there are expected to be bargaining problems such as information
asymmetries or coordination problems, a mandatory crystalline
inalienability rule might be appropriate. Finally, if the norm is not
well understood or is difficult to articulate, one underappreciated goal
of a remedial scheme may be to encourage norm articulation. Where
this is the case, a muddy (or norm-dependent/norm-laden) property
rule might be the appropriate choice. In Part IV, I will discuss the
costs of muddy property, and develop some of the tradeoffs. Finally,
in Part V, I will tentatively suggest two ways to reduce such costs,
first, to create a regime of "muddy standardization," and second, to
create a summary collective procedure for pre-clearing transfers of
personal information. I suggest that such a procedure might be
modeled loosely on the bankruptcy procedure used for selling assets
of the estate free and clear of liens, encumbrances, and other
interests, pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. I
conclude tentatively that, if muddy standardization is linked to such a
summary proceeding for quieting title, property-based protection of
information privacy may be beneficial.

22. While the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Video Privacy
Protection Act both provide for equitable relief, these only apply in the limited context of
"interception" of telephone and e-mail communication and the context of video rentals.
See infra pp. 905-06. Peter Swire points out, and I am indebted to him for this insight, that
the shift from property-based enforcement to liability-based or public enforcement may
also have a temporal component. Statutes enacted since the early 1990s (i.e., after the
VPPA), have limited the enforcement mechanism to public enforcement or liability-based
private enforcement. Audio tape: Joint Program of Sections on Antitrust and Economic
Regulation, Commercial and Related Consumer Law, Property Law, and Remedies, held
at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 2, 2003) (on file
with author).
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I. Private Rights of Action: Individual Compensation v.
Enforcement of Public Policy Under the Existing
Remedial Schemes
Since my topic is "private rights of action," the first question that
must be asked is what private rights of action exist to enforce
information privacy, and to the extent that those rights exist, what
remedies are available to enforce them? As a matter of scope, I will
not, therefore, be talking about substantive entitlements enforceable
against the government. Constitutional protections, such as the
Fourth Amendment, and the rights to intimate and expressive
association are beyond the scope of this Article. Also, though they
are relevant, and mentioned, I will not principally be talking about
public enforcement of privacy rights by government agencies, such as
the FTC. 3 My focus will be on private enforcement rights, available
to individuals who have been harmed.
As a general matter, the common law of torts provides some
protection in some jurisdictions through the so-called tort of invasion
of privacy." More importantly,2 privacy protection may be engineered
as a matter of private contract. The privacy policies that appear on
web sites are an attempt by web site owners to define their rights and
obligations with regard to the information that they gather. In
addition, context-specific, targeted statutes govern use of personal
information in the private sector. These include the Video Privacy
Protection Act ("VPPA"),26 which protects the privacy of video
rentals, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLB"),2 which protects
financial privacy, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 8
which applies to credit reporting agencies. Each statute has its own
distinct remedial scheme, and each shares a certain ad hoc quality.
To give a few examples:

23. To the extent that enforcement schemes are being judged against a standard of
"optimal" enforcement, my analysis does not include the possibility of government
enforcement as part of the equation. This may lead to some undercounting. However, to
the extent that privacy rights violations can be prevented by a property-based regime, they
alleviate the need for public enforcement.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977); Samuel D. Warren & Louis
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,213 (1890).
25. Janger, supra note 2, at 1823. See also Walter W. Miller, Jr. & Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card?, 38 HOuS.
L. REV. 777, 799-807 (2001) (noting that while privacy policies may be enforceable as
contracts, the damages are likely to be difficult to calculate).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
27. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
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The Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA") protects
personal information collected by state motor vehicles
departments from disclosure to other government officials,
and to private parties.29 It creates a private right of action
for knowing violations," and provides for payment of
actual damages to the extent that they exceed $2500,
liquidated damages of $2500 to the extent that the plaintiff
is not able to prove greater damages, punitive damages for
willful violations, an award of costs and a reasonable
attorney's fee, and equitable relief.31 The32 DPPA also
makes it a crime to knowingly violate the act.
" The Fair Credit Reporting Act provides a private right of
action with a similar mix of actual, statutory, and punitive
relief, coupled with attorney's fees.33 However, under the
FCRA, minimum statutory damages are only $100, and
actual damages are capped at $1000, unless there was a
"knowing" violation. 4 The FCRA does not provide for
equitable relief, but it does provide for criminal penalties
for "pretexting"
(knowingly obtaining consumer
information on false pretenses, in violation of the FCRA).35
" The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act36
("COPPA") regulates disclosure of identifiable personal
information about children gathered online, makes
violation of the Act a deceptive trade practice within the
meaning of the FTC Act, 7 and confers parens patriae
jurisdiction on state attorneys general." As such,
enforcement of the COPPA is solely by public officials, not
by private right of action.
" Similarly, the GLB requires certain financial institutions to
provide their customers with notice of their privacy
practices and a right to opt-out (i.e., prevent any
"

29. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000).
30. Id. § 2724(a) ("A person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal
information from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under this chapter
shall be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains, who may bring a civil
action in a United States district court.").
31. Id. § 2724(b).
32. Id. § 2723.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
34. Id.

35. Id. § 1681(q).
36. Id. §§ 6501-06.
37. Id. § 6502(c).
38. Id. § 6504(a)(1).
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disclosures to non-affiliated entities)." There is no private
right of action."
* The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA")
and e-mail
protects the privacy of telephone
and provides for civil damages,
correspondence,
injunctive relief, and public equitable and criminal
enforcement for violations.42
* The VPPA does not provide for public enforcement, but
provides the most extensive scheme for private
enforcement, allowing actual damages, liquidated statutory
damages of not less than $2500, attorney's fees, and
preliminary and equitable relief. 3
All of these statutes, except the VPPA, allow for public
enforcement. Some provide for public enforcement only, while
others allow for private enforcement as well.
As such, the various schemes can be divided into three broad
public enforcement, private enforcement, and dual
categories:
enforcement. Where private enforcement is involved, two further
divisions exist-those that protect information through liability-based
protection, and those that give personal information "property"-like
status (see Figure 1). For the most part, however, private remedies
are cast in terms of compensatory damages, statutory damages, and
attorney's fees. While three of the four statutes that provide for a
private right of action allow for equitable relief (the ECPA, VPPA,
and DPPA), those statutes cover only a narrow range of activities
(video rentals, drivers' license data, and phone records). By contrast,
the private right of action that applies to the broadest range of ecommerce activity, the FCRA, does not provide for equitable relief."
Moreover, the other, newer statutes, COPPA and GLB, do not
provide for private enforcement at all. As such, private enforcement
is left by and large to the common law of tort and contract and the
principal remedy available for tortious acts and breach of contract is

39. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 502, 113 Stat. at 1437-39. See Edward J. Janger & Paul
M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy and the Limits of Default
Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1224 (2002).
40. Id. at 1225.
41. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20,2701-09 (2000).
42. Id. §§ 2511, 2520, 2521, 2707.
43. Id. § 2710(c).
44. At least one court has read the fact that the FCRA grants injunctive power to the
government but not as a private remedy as precluding such a remedy. In re Trans Union
Corp. Privacy Litig., No. 00 C 4729, 2002 WL 31028234, at **8-9 (N.D. I11.Sept. 10, 2002).
Cf. Washington v. CSC Credit Serv., 199 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2000) (Fair Credit
Reporting Act's express grant of injunctive power to government and silence with regard
to equitable relief in connection with private right of action clearly manifests an intent to
preempt the district court's inherent equitable powers).
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damages. Only in extraordinary cases are injunctions available, and

in most cases, this will only be after a violation has already occurred.45
Figure 1

TypMlogr

To the extent that private rights of action exist, the purposes

seem to be somewhat schizophrenic-torn between creating a partydriven scheme for public enforcement and providing a scheme for
private compensation. While the common law rights are directed
more toward compensation,46 the statutory damages schemes
provided for in the DPPA, VPPA, and FCRA appear to be directed

at using private parties as an adjunct to, or substitute for, public
enforcement. A common theme in each of the statutory remedial

schemes is that recovering actual personal damages is not going to be
a sufficient incentive to bring suit. This realization is further reflected
in the complete reliance on public enforcement under GLB and
45. For reasons discussed below, specific performance and equitable relief may be
available for invasions of privacy. As such, these rights may provide a version of the
"muddy property" rights that I advocate. Because of the limited scope of the privacy tort,
and the market imperfections involved in negotiating privacy policies, discussed below,
they have not yet, and may never, become significant bulwarks of privacy protection.
46. The standard measure of damages in tort is to compensate the plaintiff for any
harm to the plaintiff caused by the tortfeasor. The standard measure of damages in
contract is to compensate the non-breaching party for any harm and any lost expectation.
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COPPA, and in the addition of statutory damages and attorney's fees
under the DPPA, VPPA, and FCRA. As such, these private rights of
action must be looked at both in terms of their adequacy for
individual compensation and their capacity for enforcing public
norms through creating appropriate incentives. As I will discuss in
the next section, an approach that "prices" violations rather than
prohibiting them falls short on both measures.
II. Civil Liability and Its Limits
As noted above, while some targeted statutes grant the power to
obtain an injunction, the broader FCRA does not, 47 and equitable
remedies are not "ordinarily" available for contractual violations.
Moreover, protection does not run with the information, even under
the statutes that provide for equitable relief. Once information has
been disclosed to a third party, there is nothing in any of these
regimes that places restrictions on the use of the information by those
who receive it in contravention of a duty of confidentiality. In short,
the private rights of action that are available to protect most personal
information are based principally in liability rather than property. In
this section, I will explore the limits of liability-based protection.
There is a large literature on the distinction between property
and liability rules, and a number of definitions of the two concepts
have been used. For Calabresi and Melamed, the distinction between
property and liability turns on remedy-in particular on whether the
right is enforceable by damages or affirmative judicial sanction. 8
Hansmann and Kraakman make the difference turn on whether the49
right runs with the property and is enforceable against successors.
Finally, Merrill and Smith use a definition derived from the work of
Wesley Hohfeld, calling property rights "multital" or "in rem"
(running against the thing and good against the world) and liability
rights "paucital" or "in personam" (running against the person).
Under any of these definitions, the remedies for violations of
information privacy entitlements are liability-based. The defendant is
47. Indeed, in the Trans Union case, the court held that Congress' express grant of
injunction power to the FTC under the FCRA, and the failure to so specify when granting
a private right of action, manifested Congress' intent to preempt the district court's
inherent equitable powers. In re Trans Union, 2002 WL 31028234, at **9-10.

48. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV 1089, 1092-93 (1972).
49. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 378:
For our purposes, the attribute that distinguishes a property right from a contract
right is that a property right is enforceable, not just against the original grantor of
the right, but also against other persons to whom possession of the asset, or other
rights in the asset, are subsequently transferred.
50. Merrill & Smith, Property/ContractInterface, supra note 9, at 778.
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called upon to pay damages, not fined or imprisoned for contempt.
Injunctions, where available, are prospective only, and once
information is disclosed, no sanction runs against the recipient. The
obligations do not inhere in the information itself, but run between
the individual whose information is at stake and the person who has
promised to keep it confidential.
Liability has its limits as a means of enforcing privacy rights. In
particular, it is not likely to provide adequate enforcement of privacy
norms or adequate compensation for privacy invasion for three
reasons: (1) the "judgment proof" problem, (2) the fact that privacy

harms are largely dignitary rather than monetary, and (3) the victims
of privacy invasions are likely to face serious coordination problems.
A. Liability and the Judgment Proof Problem

A common attribute of many of the web sites and dot-coms of
the late 1990s was that they were thinly capitalized. Moreover, many
dot-com businesses "mined" personal data as an element of their
business plan. They gathered personal data from their customers
with the intention of selling it. When these companies began to fail in
2000, many sought to sell their customer data.' To the extent that
there were restrictions on the sale of personal data, they were selfimposed through published privacy policies. The Toysmart.com case
is the classic example.52 There, a bankrupt online toy store sought to
sell its customer list, and was challenged by the FTC.5 3 There are
other instances, both reported and unreported,14 including recent
51. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Privacy or Creditors: Who Holds the Trump?, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 4, 2000, at Al (forty-one dot-coms had shut down by August 8, 2000).
52. Stipulation and Order Establishing Conditions on Sale of Customer Information,
In re Toysmart.com, No. 00-13995 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 20, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/toysmarttbankruptcy.l.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003). See
Jane Kaufman Winn & James R. Wrathall, Who Owns The Customer? The Emerging Law
of Commercial Transactions in Electronic Customer Data, 56 Bus. LAW. 213, 227-28
(2001) ("Toysmart.com had retained the services of The Recovery Group, a Boston
management consultant, in an effort to find buyers for its assets. A Wall Street Journal
advertisement for Toysmart.com's asset sale listed, among other things: 'Intangibles, i.e.,
URL name, databases, customer lists, marketing plans, web site content, [and] software
intellectual property."'). The Toysmart case was widely reported at the time. See Matt
Richtel, Toysmart.com in Settlement with F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2000, at Cl; Laura
Lorek, When Toysmart Broke, INTERACTIVE WK. FROM ZDWIRE, Aug. 7, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 4067740. See also Stephen F. Ambrose, Jr. & Joseph W. Gelb, Consumer
Privacy Regulation and Litigation, 56 Bus. LAW. 1157 (2001); Andrew B. Buxbaum &
Louis A. Curcio, When You Can't Sell to Your Customers, Try Selling Your Customers
(But Not Under the Bankruptcy Code), 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 395 (2000).
53. Stipulation and Order, In re Toysmart.com (No. 00-13995).
54. An online travel agency, eTour, Inc., sought to sell its customer lists to Ask Jeeves,
Inc., and drew an objection from the Electronic Privacy Information Center. Letter from
Marc Rotenberg and Andrew Shen to National Association of Attorneys General and
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concerns raised about the possible sale of frequent flyer databases by
bankrupt airlines." These stories illustrate that the enforceability of
these privacy policies is problematic where companies are insolvent.
To the extent that privacy policies are contracts, the principal remedy
is contract damages; contractual damages, however, are, as a general
rule, dischargeable in bankruptcy.56 Even if the debt were nondischargeable, 7 which it is not,58 to the extent that the debtor is
liquidating and selling its data, recourse against an empty corporate
shell is not worth much.
Legal economists have long recognized that the officers of
companies that are insolvent (or nearly so) are faced with a number
of morally problematic choices.59
To honor their duty to
shareholders, it may be a worthwhile gamble to violate a privacy
policy, sell data, and hope that the additional money helps keep the
business afloat. This is sometimes referred to as the "moral hazard"
associated with insolvency. Even if the duty is to other creditors, the
sale of data and breach of a privacy promise may bring in significant
revenue that can then be distributed among the other claimants.'
Thus, to the extent that the objects of privacy legislation are thinly
capitalized entities, the efficacy of liability-based enforcement
mechanisms is likely to be limited both inside and outside of
bankruptcy.
B.

Liability and "Lumping It"

Even where the party gathering data is not undercapitalized,
liability-based privacy protections are not likely to provide efficient
Federal

Trade

Commission

(May

25,

2001),

available

at

http://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/etour.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
55. Ryan Singel, Frequent Fliers Fear Privacy Loss, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 18, 2003,

available at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,58470,00.html
2003).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (2000).

(last visited Apr. 19,

57. Id. § 523.

58. Id.
59. For an introduction to the so-called "judgment proof" problem, see S. Shavell, The
Judgment ProofProblem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45 (1986) ("An injurer will treat
liability that exceeds his assets as imposing an effective financial penalty only equal to his
assets...."). See also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1996):
Think of the liability system as a poker game.... Players risk their chips, that is,
their wealth, by tossing them into the pot, that is, investing them in liabilitygenerating economic activity. Chips contributed to the pot are at risk of loss; the
system can take them to satisfy liability. Chips withheld are not at risk.
60. For contract-based relationships, the combined effect of the bankruptcy discharge,
and the power to reject executory contracts encourages this result when the debtor is in
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 524. Indeed, the preference power sometimes allows the
trustee to breach contractual obligations that the debtor sought to perform prior to
bankruptcy. Id. § 547.
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inceitives to maintain privacy. A second shortcoming of liabilitybased remedies is the problem of "lumping it." Invasions of privacy
cause dignitary harm rather than financial harm in most cases,
therefore a statute predicated on actual damages will not provide a
significant incentive to bring suit. Even where statutory damages and
attorney's fees are available, the damages are not huge, and the risk
associated with bringing suit will limit the availability of counsel."

Class actions may help address this problem, but recent case law
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act casts doubt on whether a class
action litigation strategy is viable.62 As such, the protection offered
either by actual damages or by statutory damages is insufficient. In
short, it just doesn't seem as if current law is serious about enforcing
data privacy rights.
C.

Liability and the Twin Tragedies of the Information Commons
If, as the above analysis suggests, personal information is pretty
much just there for the taking, or at least underprotected, then we
have described personal information as a type of "common property."
The question therefore arises whether non-protection of personal
information may give rise to tragic consequences. A "tragedy of the
commons" (Figure 2) arises when multiple parties (Common Owners
1-6 in Figure 2 below) have a common right to use (i.e., graze sheep
on) particular piece of property (the commons). Each common
owner has an incentive to overuse (graze as many sheep as possible)
the property, and overuse (overgrazing) in turn destroys the value of
the common asset.63 The answer to this question would therefore
appear to be yes.

61. Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of the
Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 33 (1996).
62. See In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., No. 00 C 4729, 2002 WL 31028234, at

*23 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2002). In that case, the court refused to certify a class under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, under Rule 23(b)(1) (limited fund); (b)(2) (equitable relief); or
(b)(3) (common questions of fact and law predominate and class action is the most

efficient means of adjudication). Id. at **17-23. In that case, the court faced a class of 190
million members, each with a potential minimum statutory damage claim of $100. Id. at
*18. The court concluded that even though the aggregated statutory damage claims
exceeded the net worth of the defendant, the limited fund exception did not apply because
no trust or other pool of money was involved. Id. The court further concluded that as a
matter of statutory interpretation, equitable relief was not available under the FCRA in a
private right of action, id. at **8, 18, and finally, the court concluded that, since the size of
the potential liability was so great, allowing the case to go forward as a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action would not be efficient. Id. at **19-23. See also Washington v. CSC Credit Serv.,
199 F.3d 263, 267-68 (5th Cir. 2000) (denying class certification under the FCRA).

63. See, e.g., SUZANNE IUDICELLO, MICHAEL WEBER & ROBERT WIELAND, FISH,
MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF OVERFISHING 36 (1999).
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Figure 2

Col
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Indeed, two separate and distinct privacy commons appear to
exist. From a dignitary perspective, routine invasions of privacy for
commercial purposes are just something that we, as individuals,
would prefer to avoid. However, the nature of the first privacy
commons runs deeper than a simple question of whether, in the
aggregate, people are less happy in a world without privacy than they
might be in a world where they felt their privacy was protected. I join
Paul Schwartz and others in believing that at some level, privacy is a
value that is constitutive of a free society, and a necessary
precondition to self-governance.' When viewed this way, privacy is
not defined by what information we withhold from society; it is
instead a regime of norms and law that shape our expectations about
how information will be used once it has been shared with others.
There are many such "multidimensional privacy spaces" that shape
an individual's interaction with the world. When I share information
with my wife, I have one set of expectations; when I share the same
information with my doctor, I have another set of expectations.
When I circulate a draft paper to a close group of colleagues, I have
64. See Janger & Schwartz, supra note 39, at 1250-51; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Democracy in Cyberspace,52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1661-64 (1999).
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one set of expectations; when I include it in a set of symposium
materials, my expectations are different. Many of these "privacy"
arrangements require coordination, and many are not susceptible to
creation by individual bargaining. While individuals might be willing
to bargain away their privacy in return for cheaper airplane tickets,
the resulting world may not be one that is socially desirable. The
second, somewhat thinner, privacy commons arises from a
commercial perspective. To the extent that consumers feel that their
privacy is not protected on the Internet, they may refrain from
engaging in transactions in cyberspace. Just as securities regulation is
crucial to investor faith in the securities markets, some privacy
regulation may be necessary to foster confidence in the Internet.
Liability-based protection of personal property may therefore
lead to a tragedy of the commons, both for civil society and for
private commerce.
III. The Promise and Problems of Propertization
Lawrence

Lessig has suggested that granting consumers a

property right in personal information might solve all of these
problems.65 Stated differently, when faced with the difficulties of
common property, the solution is to fence the commons.
Figure 3

Fenced Commons

65. LESSIG, supra note 14, at 159-62.
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A hypothetical based on the Toysmart.com facts may be helpful
to illustrate this approach.66 Imagine that I want to purchase a baby
present. To order the item, I have to give certain information to the
web site. At this stage of the transaction, propertization is not
particularly important. If I don't want to give Toysmart my
information, I don't have to.67 But, assume that I decide that before I
give them my information, I want them to guarantee that they will
only use it in certain ways, and they agree. At this point, the choice
between property and liability becomes crucial because it determines
how much legal protection is given to that promise.
If I am protected solely by a contractual promise, then Toysmart
might decide to disclose my information and pay damages. If I am
protected by a Calabresian property right, then Toysmart cannot
disclose my information without my permission. At first blush,
property has the potential to remedy all of the shortcomings of a
liability-based regime. Granting consumers the power to veto any use
of their personal information that does not conform to a prior
agreement might eliminate the judgment proof problem. If disclosure
is effectively prevented, then damages are not necessary. Giving
consumers a pre-disclosure veto would eliminate the problem of
"lumping it." Even though privacy harms are dignitary, consumers
would control the terms of secondary use. And finally, by turning
personal information into personal private property, the commons
will be fenced and the tragedy averted. Propertization is not a
panacea, however. Propertization alone may fail to solve the
commons problem, and it may create other problems.
A.

Propertization and Market Imperfection

Where an entitlement is protected by a liability rule, the
defendant may choose to violate the right and pay damages. In other
words, a non-consensual taking may precede negotiation over price.
Propertization changes the order of this interaction. Either through
criminal sanction, affirmative judicial order, or prohibitively high
(and/or punitive) fines, a property rule makes a non-consensual
taking infeasible. Transfers of property happen only through
consensual transactions. Propertization of personal information
means that someone who holds the information of another, subject to
a property-based encumbrance, cannot transfer that information
66. See supra Part II.A and note 52.
67. The fact that the initial disclosure is always voluntary gives rise to the mistaken
impression that consumers always control the terms under which their information is used.
However, as shown below, adhesion problems, cognitive problems, coordination
problems, and the absence of property-based protection render the nature of this
"consent" suspect.
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without consent. A company cannot sell its customer list in violation
of a privacy policy without permission.
However, a number of imperfections in the personal information
market render propertization an imperfect fence for the commons.
First, a property right is not worth much if you can be tricked into
giving it up for free. Without putting too fine a point on it, this is the
problem in the "information" marketplace. There are significant
information asymmetries inherent in personal information
transactions that involve consumers. Consumers do not know how
the information they provide will be used, nor do they know how it
could be used.68 Moreover, even if they do insist on limitations on
use, they are not in a position to police the agreement. When a
telemarketer calls or "spam" appears in your e-mail box, it is virtually
impossible to figure out how the tele- or cyber-marketer identified
you. In many cases even if consumers could police the use of
information, the contract offered would take the form of a contract of
adhesion.69 And, finally, even if there is negotiating room, consumers
are not likely to know what forms of disclosure are required to
accomplish the desired transaction."
One might argue that even where there are problems with
individual transactions, the market could still provide the solution.
Individual market participants might find it to their advantage to
compete on the basis of privacy practices. Since detection is virtually
impossible, however, the development of this practice is likely to be
slow.
More importantly, economists Spence, Stiglitz, and Akerlof have
shown that consumers are not good at negotiating and/or shopping on
the basis of non-price terms.7" In other words, consumers, given a
choice between better privacy (which they don't understand) and a
better price (which they do understand), will choose the lower price
every time. As a result, web sites have no incentive to compete on
the basis of privacy, and the result may be what economists call a
"lemons equilibrium," where the market only produces bad privacy
68. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 476 (2000) ("[M]ost users are not even
aware that the web sites they visit collect user information, and even if they are cognizant
of that possibility, they have little conception of how personal data might be processed.").
69. Janger, supra note 2, at 1812.
70. Janger & Schwartz, supra note 39 at 1255 ("Imagine the intense level of research
that consumers would be forced to carry out in evaluating the information security

standards of one bank versus another.").
71. George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz won the 2001 Nobel Prize
in Economics for their work on the effect of asymmetric information on markets. See
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970); Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions,
Product Failureand ProducerLiability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561, 561 (1977).
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practices.72 For these reasons, a crystalline, fully alienable property
right is not likely to protect the privacy of web site customers or to
prevent the destruction of either of the privacy commons.
B. Muddy Property: A Solution?

In my earlier article, entitled Muddy Property: Generating and
Protecting Information Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy, I argued that
the "commons" and market imperfection problems that infect privacy
transactions could be alleviated through the use of a "muddy"
property rule. 73 The rationale behind "muddy property" is threefold.
First, as property, it gives information holders a veto over involuntary
disclosure, and imposes sanctions on subsequent use of that
information.74 Second, because it is muddy, it encourages dialogue
among the parties about privacy-related behavior.7 And third, where
the parties cannot agree, it encourages common law adjudication of
those rights, and the resulting public articulation of privacy norms by
judges.7 Since we as a society are still in the process of developing
and articulating the norms that will govern personal data transactions,
the norms need to be articulated by some public institution-a
legislature, a court, or an agency. A muddy property rule has the
potential both to regulate privacy transactions at the ground level and
to increase the likelihood of private and public articulation of norms.
A muddy, or limited, property rule encourages discussion and
articulation of privacy norms both inside and outside the judicial
system.
I am not the first to advocate the imperfect fencing of a
commons. In separate works on intellectual property, privacy, and
torts, Lawrence Lessig, Paul Schwartz, and Lynn LoPucki have each
shown that certain types of common property are necessary to the
creation and maintenance of a society that is respectively innovative,
72. As I discuss in detail below, propertization creates a number of other costs as well.
Since both of these problems are accentuated when "muddy property" is involved, I
reserve a detailed discussion for that section, but any form of new property may also
create a mirror of the "commons problem." Michael Heller has noted that where property
rights are highly fragmented-in other words, where the commons is divided into pieces
that are exceedingly small-the result may be that the same coordination problems which
result in overuse in a "commons" will produce underuse. Heller, Tragedy, supra note 8, at
623-24. Heller calls this a "tragedy of the anticommons." Id. Multiple rights to exclude
lead to underuse, or non-use of the asset. Id. Finally, propertizing personal information
may create what Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have called "information costs."

Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 7, at 8-9. It may be difficult to determine
whether personal information is encumbered by a privacy policy or not.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Janger, supra note 2, at 1809.
Id.
Id. at 1815.
Id.
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free, and safe.77 Each has argued that enforcement of a social norm or
common value requires the limitation on an otherwise crystalline
property regime. Lessig describes what he calls the "innovation
commons." 7 Schwartz describes what he calls "constitutive privacy,"
or a privacy commons.7 9 LoPucki describes the need to encourage
social investment in safety."0 Preventing one "tragedy of the
commons" can thus create another that might be termed the "tragedy
of fencing."

Once a commons is fenced, there is no longer a commons. To
economists this is not troubling, because the people who formerly
shared the commons will now have appropriate investment
incentives. As a result, the aggregate value of the once common
property will be higher when it is held in private hands. However,
common property may have value precisely because it is common.
Protecting a residual commons (figure 4) places limits on the extent
to which we, as a society, will allow the commons to be fenced.
Figure 4

Residual Commons
C02
/

CO1

C03

C04

C06
C05

Lessig, in his book, The Future of Ideas,"l develops a concept he
terms the "innovation commons." The innovation commons is

77. LESSIG, supra note 6, at 19-23; LoPucki, Creditor'sBargain,supra note 7, at 1963;
Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1613.
78. LESSIG, supra note 6, at 23.
79. Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1613.

80. LoPucki, Creditor'sBargain, supranote 7, at 1963.
81. LESSIG, supra note 6, at 49.
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threatened by the expansion of copyright protection. 2 Copyright and
patent law have always been intended to take some ideas and works
of art out of the public domain in order to encourage writers,
thinkers, inventors, and artists to produce. 3 Without copyright,
But
writers, musicians, and artists could not earn a living.
copyright's protections have always had limits-both in duration and
in scope-and these limits, Lessig argues, are important to society as
well, because without a public domain the marketplace of ideas will
be replaced by private monopolies.85 To remedy this, Lessig proposes
limitations on the scope of intellectual property rights such as fair use,
and limited terms.86
In his work on information privacy, Paul Schwartz has identified

a similar privacy commons, which he labels "constitutive privacy." "7
In his view, in the new economy, the private sphere has the attributes
of a public good. Without some limits on the rights of third-party
holders of non-public personal information, Schwartz anticipates a
collapse of the private sphere that is necessary to individual selfrealization and to the functioning of a democratic society. 9 He argues
that fair information practices, or "FIPS," should be used to protect
the privacy commons, and suggests that a mixed regime of property
and liability rules might be necessary to protect personal privacy.' I
have gone further, and proposed a regime of "muddy propert4 " rules
based on FIPS as a means of protecting the privacy commons.
This use of property rules to enforce norms and preserve public
goods is not limited to the "intellectual property" sphere. Lynn
LoPucki, who disagrees with everything I have said about privacy
property,92 has proposed his own version of norm-enforcing property
in the torts context. In his extraordinary articles, The Unsecured
Creditors' Bargain3 and The Death of Liability,94 LoPucki
demonstrates that secured credit can be used as a judgment proofing
device to insulate tortfeasors from any form of liability for invasion of
82. Id. at 175.
83. Id. at 58-59.
84. Id. at 59.
85. Id. at 201.
86. See id. at 240-61.
87. Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1613.
88. Id. at 1663.
89. Id. at 1663-64.
90. Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters,
Privacy Control,and Fair Information Practices,2000 WiS. L. REV. 743, 781-86 (2000).
91. Janger, supra note 2, at 1875-78.
92. Lynn M. LoPucki, Did Privacy Cause Identity Theft?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1277
(2003).
93. LoPucki, Creditor's Bargain,supra note 7, at 1903-04.
94. LoPucki, supra note 59, at 23-30.
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privacy, product liability, or any other civil wrong. According to
LoPucki, overzealous protection of the "property rights" of secured
creditors will lead to social underinvestment in safety.5 He proposes
instead that tort claimants be given a superpriority lien on the assets
of the tortfeasor.96 Such a lien or priority would not only reduce the
risk faced by tort victims, but it would have the salutary effect of
making secured creditors worry about the safety of their rights in the
loan collateral."
Rendering their property rights less secure
encourages them to monitor the debtor's investment in safety, and
should reduce risk ex ante.
At the same time, however, muddy property may increase
information costs by making it more difficult to determine who holds
the right to use the personal information and whether the competing
claimant must consent. It also may make it more difficult and
expensive to verify who the "owner" of the information is; indeed,
nothing short of litigation may suffice. Finally, muddy property
further fragments the right to use personal information, and may
create an anticommons. In the next section, I consider the costs
associated with property rights generally, and with "muddy property"
rights in particular.
IV. Muddy Property, Information Cost, Verification
Institutions, and the Anticommons
Property law is usually thought of as a way to allocate social
resources to individuals. The language of property is the language of
exclusion: "A man's home is his castle," "No trespassing," "Beware
of dog." Property rights carry with them the right to "pull up the
drawbridge," "call the cops," or "sic the dog" to defend against theft
or invasion. While ownership may encourage investment, and
investment has social benefits, property is a zero-sum game. That
which is private cannot be common. Such exclusion has costs, and
therefore society must be careful to delineate what can be owned, and
what cannot.
Muddy property rules are a mechanism for protecting and
defining the residual commons, a mechanism for balancing the
externalities of exclusion against the tragic consequences of fully
common property.
However, recent property scholarship has
recognized that there are costs associated with non-standard and
incomplete conveyances of property. These costs come in two types:
(1) information costs and (2) fragmentation costs. Each of these costs
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 61-63.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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must be considered, and, if possible, ameliorated, as legislatures and
courts determine whether to create and how to shape property rights
to govern novel transactions.
A. Information

Merrill and Smith note in their recent work that property rights
bind third parties.9" Trespassers and thieves may be prosecuted.
People who I don't know, who don't know me, and who have not had
any contact with my transferor must respect my property rights,
whatever they are. Merrill and Smith argue that this third party effect
of "property" gives rise to a need for, and explains the prevalence of,
the limited number of, standardized forms of property-what they
The negative
(and the civil law) call the "numerus clausus."
inference from Merrill and Smith's thesis is that new forms of
property are suspect because they likely add to third party
confusion.' This confusion is costly because it makes it difficult to
contract about property-if the right's owner cannot be identified,
and if the scope of their property right cannot be stated with
certainty, transactions involving that property will be problematic."
Standardization thus reduces the cost of transactions about
property.'03
Hansmann and Kraakman take a different view of the
information problem. ' They acknowledge that transactions about
property require good information about the identity of the owner
and the scope of the owner's rights,"5 but challenge the idea that
standardization is required in order to achieve this goal.' ° For them,
the key is verification. 7 So long as an institution exists that will allow
potential purchasers to identify the owner of the property and will
allow the owner to prove the scope of his rights, then there should be
no problem with slicing up the bundle of sticks in any way the
owner/transferor desires."'
While Merrill and Smith and Hansmann and Kraakman may
differ over the question of standardization, they both agree that there
should be some place where accurate information about the identity
99. Merrill & Smith, Property/ContractInterface, supra note 9, at 77. See also Merrill
& Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 9, at 27-28.
100. Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 9, at 28-34.
101. See supra note 21.
102. Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supranote 9, at 26-27.
103. Id.
104. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 373-74.
105. Id. at 1805.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1805-06.
108. Id.
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of the owner and the scope of ownership should be available."°
Norm-laden property poses a problem for both a standardizationbased system and a verification-based system. To the extent that the
duties that encumber property are amorphous, they may operate as a
cloud on title and an obstacle to transactions.
B.

Fragmentation
A second concern about new types of property is raised by
Michael Heller."' As he sees it, information problems are not the
only issue."'
Coordination is also a problem, even once the
information privacy commons is fenced."' Although the standard
justification for property lies in the coordination problem faced by
common owners, Heller points out that fragmented ownership may
create precisely the same coordination problems as common
ownership."4 The creation of many new types of property may have
the effect of creating multiple fractional owners of a particular asset." 5
When these fractional owners face coordination problems, an
"anticommons" develops. 16 Each fractional owner can exclude all
other fractional owners, and a collective action problem ensues. '
While the classic collective action problem arises because of free
riding," 8 here each common owner has an incentive to hold out for
the highest possible price in return for consent."9 Where each
common owner has an incentive to hold out, the asset will go unused.
All three norm-laden forms of property raise fragmentation
problems that would trouble Heller. Lessig's limited intellectual
property rights subject the copyright or patent owner to multiple
competing claims of fair use. Muddy information privacy rights are
particularly problematic whenever personal information is
aggregated, and its value inheres in the numerous names and
characteristics embodied in the database. If a mailing list has value,
granting an enforceable veto right to each name on the list would
destroy any saleable value that the list might have. Finally, LoPucki's

109. Id. at 1814; Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 9, at 26-27.
110. Heller, Boundaries, supra note 10, at 1165-67; Heller, Tragedy, supra note 10, at
622-25.
111. Heller, Tragedy, supra note 10, at 623.
112. Id. at 623-24.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:

THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965).
119. Heller, Tragedy, supra note 10, at 623-24.
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"torts first" priority subjects the owners of property to multiple,
difficult to identify, possibly unmatured claims that might prime the
rights of any purchaser of the property.
The combined message of Merrill and Smith, Heller, and to a
lesser extent Hansmann and Kraakman is: "Don't create new types
of property, and if you do, keep them simple and undivided, or at
least verifiable."
But there is a counter-story. Just because norm-laden property
rights impose information and fragmentation costs doesn't mean that
they should be discarded as a means of norm enforcement. First,
some social goals are so important that the costs may be justified.
And second, with some careful thought and attention it may be
possible to develop legal mechanisms that reduce the information and
fragmentation costs associated with norm enforcement.
V. Cutting Costs Through Muddy Standardization and a
Collective Procedure for Quieting Title
To what extent is it possible to reduce the information and
fragmentation costs associated with using a norm-enforcing property
rule to protect data privacy? Some of these costs are unavoidable.
The very idea of norm enforcement entails competing claims. By
definition, muddy property limits the extent to which rights holders
can be identified with certainty. However, some information cost
savings can be achieved through standardization by making the
property right mandatory, while verification and fragmentation costs
can be reduced by providing a collective procedure for quieting title
in personal information.
A. Mandatory Muddy Standardization

Information costs cannot be completely eliminated when one is
trying to use property rules to enforce norms. Standardization alone
will not solve the norm-enforcement problem. The Protocol for
Privacy Protection, or "P3P," provides a good example of why this is
the case. P3P is a computerized protocol under which a web surfer
can set his computer to travel only to sites that provide a chosen
menu of privacy protections. P3P has made some level of privacy
standardization possible.2 Privacy policies can, in some contexts, be
reduced to a limited menu of terms, and those terms can be specified
as a field along with the data. These standardized terms can be the
subject, in turn, of standardized negotiation. However, while P3P
120. For a discussion of P3P, see Joseph M. Reagle, Jr. & Rigo Wenning, P3P and
Privacy on the Web FAQ, Platform for Privacy Preference Project, at http://www.w3.org/
P3P/P3FAQ.html (Apr. 18,2000).
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may solve the standardization problem, it does not solve the adhesion
problem inherent in many online negotiations. Also, for the reasons
discussed above, it may not be possible or desirable to specify the
exact scope of the privacy obligation. The line between primary use
and secondary use may be easy to draw in some contexts, but it may
be difficult to draw in others. It is not fair, or wise, to require
ordinary web site customers to draw a line where they do not have
sufficient resources to do so.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act presents another excellent
example of a failed attempt to grant a standardized privacy package.'21
GLB grants notice and opt-out rights to customers of a financial
institution, but the opt-out rights apply only when the institution
seeks to share information with a non-affiliated party. Where a bank
is affiliated with an insurance company and an investment bank, GLB
provides a safe harbor for "affiliate" transfers that will permit
significant secondary use. Where a customer does business with a
stand-alone local bank, by contrast, GLB may provide more
protection.
The problem with both P3P and GLB is that they each rely on
the mistaken belief that consumers can contract about privacy. P3P
operates on the assumption that if privacy policies are simplified and
standardized, consumers will be able to engage in efficient contracting
about privacy. But, for the reasons stated above, I have my doubts.
In my view, a standard yet muddy rule might work better. For
example, a mandatory rule that simply prohibits "unreasonable
secondary use" would solve part of Merrill and Smith's problem,
since any holder of information would know that they held it subject
to a duty to protect reasonable expectations of privacy. Everybody
would know what the legal duty was, and would be required to give it
meaning in the context of a particular transaction.'22 However,
because the duty is muddy, nobody would know its exact scope.
Thus, standardization of information privacy rights in muddy and
mandatory form eliminates some, but not all, of the costs feared by
Merrill and Smith.

121. For a more detailed discussion of GLB's privacy provisions, see Janger &
Schwartz, supra note 39, at 1222-30.
122. Indeed, P3P-like or other privacy enhancing technologies might operate as
technological overlays, which allow a choice among different standardized muddy
property rules that might apply in different contexts. For example, one standardized rule
might work for medical information, while another standardized rule might apply to credit
card numbers, while yet another standardized rule might apply to clickstream data about
web site preferences.

Note, however, that the technology is not being used here to

conduct a contractual negotiation, as with P3P, but instead to determine which protocol
must be applied to a particular class of data.
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Verification

On the one hand, verification institutions don't appear to add
much to the conversation. Indeed, it is not all that difficult to identify
the holder of a privacy entitlement. When a company holds personal
information about its customer, the duty, if any, runs to the person to
whom the information relates. The difficulty lies not in determining
who holds the right, but in precisely what the duty entails in particular
circumstances. The only verification institution that can resolve that
question is a court. Indeed, the reason for advocating a muddy rule
on secondary use lies in the fact that it will require ex post
determination of the scope of the duty, and will thus influence
behavior and encourage negotiation over questionable disclosures.
However, where large databases are involved, verification
problems arise in a slightly different form. While it may be possible
to identify who holds an interest in a database, it may be virtually
impossible to identify a person with authority (short of a judge) to
speak for the group. Thus, for verification reasons and additional
reasons that I discuss below, a property-based scheme for protecting
information privacy might provide for the appointment of a class
representative to bargain on behalf of individuals whose information
is contained in large aggregated databases.
C. Fragmentation
To the extent that muddy property rules impose information
costs in two-party information transactions, they may be bearable,
because those very costs are what produce the systemic investment in
norm-related negotiation. Prior to disclosure, the parties will have to
negotiate over the appropriate scope of the secondary use. However,
what looks like a benefit in the context of a two-party negotiation
begins to look like a nightmare when the value of a database lies in
the fact that it aggregates the data of hundreds, thousands, or millions
of people. The value of each piece of information is quite small. The
cost of disclosure may also be quite small, but the cost of bargaining
with each person whose information is in the database is likely to be
prohibitive. The result may be to deter certain appropriate primary
uses, and to chill secondary uses that would be efficient and desirable
simply because negotiation is not possible. Worse yet, because
bargaining is not feasible, it will not occur, and the norm-articulation
function of muddy rules may not be served either.
D. A Collective Solution for Verification and Fragmentation Problems
While information costs may be the price we pay for norm
generation, when we choose to use a muddy property rule,
fragmentation costs can be limited through the use of a collective
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mechanism for quieting title in information, and verification costs
could also be limited by appointing a guardian or representative for
customers with an interest in a database. While there might be a
number of models for such a procedure, one promising model lies in
the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy courts have significant experience
in dealing with coordination problems. Indeed, the standard
justification for business reorganizations under Chapter 11 of the
'
Bankruptcy Code rests on a "tragedy of the commons." 123
When a

debtor with a viable business becomes insolvent, creditors face a
coordination problem. Unless they act quickly to grab the assets of
the debtor, others may get there first. This classic collective action
problem often results in a "race to the courthouse," that leads, in
turn, to the inefficient liquidation of the debtor and loss of the firm's
"going concern" value.
Many of Chapter l's procedural mechanisms are aimed at
remedying this problem and encouraging a collective solution to the
debtor's financial distress, which preserves the value of the firm. For
example, the automatic stay prohibits unilateral creditor action, thus
binding creditors to the collective solution."' Similarly, the collective
action problem faced by individual small creditors, who have no
incentive to participate actively in the case, is solved through the
appointment of a creditors'
committee to negotiate on behalf of the
25
unsecured creditors.
But Chapter 11 is not just about keeping firms together.
Bankruptcy cases have always been fora for selling assets and
modifying contracts. Many companies choose to liquidate in Chapter
11, and even companies that reorganize "successfully" will often shed
assets during the course of their bankruptcy cases. Sometimes assets
are shed in an effort to refocus the business, sometimes they are sold
simply to raise cash to continue operations and sometimes
bankruptcy is used to wring value out of assets that could not be sold
without the blessing of a court.26 Indeed, Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code is increasingly being used not to solve the
traditional "commons" problem (to preserve going concern value),
but instead to resolve anticommons problems created by new forms
of property-to clear title to assets that might not otherwise be
123. Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1987, at 173, 183.
124. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
125. Id.§ 1102.
126. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 751, 751 (2002) ("Corporate reorganizations have all but disappeared. Giant
corporations make headlines when they file for Chapter 11, but they are no longer using it
to rescue a firm from imminent failure. Many use Chapter 11 merely to sell their assets
and divide up the proceeds.").
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saleable. In this regard, property owners are taking advantage of
bankruptcy's collective procedures and the availability of bankruptcy
judges to resolve disputes. This aspect of the Chapter 11 process may
suggest a model for information privacy law.
(1) 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)-A Model

Under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy
trustee has the power to use and sell assets of the debtor both inside
and outside of the ordinary course of business. Where the sale is
outside the ordinary course of business, the debtor must obtain court
approval under section 363(c) and, if the asset is encumbered, under
section 363(e), the holder of the property interest is entitled to
"adequate protection.""' This may include a continuation of the lien
on the property in the hands of the purchaser,'28 but under section
363(f) the bankruptcy court also has the power to allow the debtor to
sell property free and clear of liens, encumbrances, and other
interests under certain circumstances. 9

As it is presently constituted and used, section 363(f) would not
allow the debtor to sell personal information out from under a muddy
property rule. Current case law limits the scope of the section to liens
and liability-based covenants (i.e., covenants that do not run with the
property). However, there is some wiggle room. Section 363(f)(1)
127. Id. § 361.
128. U.C.C. § 9-315(a) (1999).
129. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000) provides:
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and
clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of
such interest; (2) such entity consents; (3) such interest is a lien and the price at
which such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens
on such property; (4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or (5) such entity could
be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction
of such interest.
A web site visitor's interest in personal information, to the extent it exists, is not a
lien, not in dispute, and likely to be enforceable by specific performance. As such, only
sections 363(f)(1) or (2) are likely to provide a means for selling personal information.
Obtaining consents will work, of course, but is unlikely to be feasible. Whether or not
current law allows the sale "free and clear" begs the question since current law does not
create a property right in information privacy. The question that would need to be
answered when designing a procedure would be: under what circumstances should a sale
free and clear be allowed?
130. Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1994); In re 523 E. Fifth St. Hous.
Pres. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568, 570-71, 576 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); cf. Miller &
O'Rourke, supra note 25, at 812-18 (noting that under the law's current contract based
approach to privacy, it would be possible to sell information out from under a privacy
policy, but that if it were given the status of property, section 363(f) would not permit such
sale). See also David Gray Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying
Themes of Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products
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permits a sale free and clear of an interest if applicable nonbankruptcy law would allow sale free of the interest. 3t Since this is a
discussion of what an information privacy property right might look
like, the question becomes: "Under what circumstances should
applicable non-bankruptcy allow a sale free and clear of an
information privacy right?" The reason that section 363 holds
interest here is that it is often used as a mechanism for resolving
anticommons problems.
(2) Sale "Free and Clear" and the Anticommons-An Example

To see the promise held out by section 363, an example might be
helpful. One familiar use of bankruptcy to facilitate a sale arises
where a valuable asset of the debtor is held subject to a number of
liens, all of which may be superior to that of the bankruptcy trustee.
Such a problem can arise in a number of ways, but here is a relatively
simple scenario. The debtor is a limited partnership which owns a
building which is under construction. The general contractor finds
itself in financial difficulty, fails to pay subcontractors, and then files
for bankruptcy. The subcontractors then file mechanics liens against
the building. The developer is faced with the unattractive alternatives
of paying the subs twice or abandoning the project. A buyer,
however, is willing to purchase the property and complete the project,
but only if it can get clear title. There is no question that the
mechanics liens will have priority over the subsequent purchase, and
will have to be paid. The problem is that there are dozens of different
liens filed against the property, many appearing to be inflated, and
the state law procedures for addressing the validity and priority of
mechanics liens are cumbersome and time consuming. The buyer is
not interested in waiting, and the longer the property sits, the less it
will be worth.
Each of these dozens of lien claimants can effectively stop the
sale, leaving everyone worse off. Under section 363(f), however, the
court can approve the sale of the property "free and clear" of the
mechanics liens, while allowing the liens to attach to the sale
proceeds. The value of the various liens and their respective
priorities can then be resolved in the ordinary course, without
delaying the sale itself.
Liability, and Toxic-Waste Cleanup, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 119, 14142; Basil H. Mattingly, Sale of Property of the Estate Free and Clear of Restrictions and
Covenants in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 431, 441-43 (1996) (arguing that
Gouveia was wrongly decided, and that section 363(f) should be available to strip
covenants from real property). But see In re Trans World Airlines, 322 F.3d 283 (3d Cir.
2003) (discharging successor liability claims against TWA).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1).
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(3) A Collective Procedurefor Quieting Title in PersonalInformation

In the absence of section 363(f), the competing lien claims
against the property would destroy its value for the estate. The
fragmented interest in the property would be unusable. This is a
classic anticommons, and section 363(f) provides a model escape
route. The question, therefore, is whether it might be possible to
craft a collective solution along these lines to deal with sales of
personal information. There would appear to be two principal
obstacles to developing such a device. The first is giving meaning to
the concept of "adequate protection" in the information privacy
context, and the second is the need for a class representative. Since
the value of personal information to individuals may be relatively
small in the particular case, there may not be anybody with a
sufficient stake to participate in the proceeding.
Both of these problems are remediable. First, to the extent that
the collective proceeding is offered as an adjunct to one of the topic
specific pieces of privacy legislation, the content of fair information
use can be spelled out for that particular context. For example, fair
information use might mean something very different in the context
of credit reporting than it does in the context of video rentals. If the
collective procedure was contained in the VPPA or the FCRA, these
differences could be accommodated.
Second, a guardian or
committee could be appointed to represent the holders of
information property rights.
This approach is not completely novel; state law has long
provided mechanisms for quieting title to property.'
The current
version of the Bankruptcy Reform Bill pending in Congress contains
a provision-the "Leahy Amendment"-that contains a first cut at a
procedure that follows this model.'33 I have discussed elsewhere its
shortcomings."' Among its strengths, however, is the fact that it
proposes the appointment of a "privacy ombudsmen" who would
negotiate on behalf of the customers of the debtor to protect their
interest in their own personal information. Similarly, another positive
attribute of the Leahy Amendment is that it places a public official (in
this case the bankruptcy judge) in a position to determine what
132. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 1941-43 (McKinney Supp. 2003). See
also 65 AM. JUR. 2D, Quieting Title and Determination of Adverse Claims §§ 1, 10-11
(2001). Quiet title actions can be used to clear encumbrances that are "invalid or
inoperative." Id. at § 13. In the context of information privacy, the analogy would be to
show that a secondary use was consistent with the customer's reasonable expectations of
privacy.
133. The Leahy Amendment can be found in sections 231 and 232 of the conference
report to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002. See
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-617, at 51-52 (2002).
134. Janger, supra note 2, at 1873-75.

April 2003]

INFORMATION COSTS AND THE ANTICOMMONS

929

actions are necessary to protect customer interests in personal
information when a data sale is proposed.
There are two fundamental problems with the Leahy
Amendment that are relevant to this discussion. 136 The first is its
failure to give any guidance on the meaning of "adequate protection"
in the information privacy context, and the second is the fact that it
exists only in the Bankruptcy Code. The only people given the
protection of the Leahy Amendment are those who give their
information to companies that actually go bankrupt. Again, both of
these problems could be solved by moving the proposed device out of
the Bankruptcy Code and into the remedial schemes of the various
privacy statutes. If, for example, the FCRA or the VPPA contained
such a collective procedure, the protection would be available inside
and outside of bankruptcy, and adequate protection could be defined
by reference to the particular goals of the statute.
In sum, if a standardized "muddy property" right is chosen as a
means for protecting information privacy, a necessary adjunct to that
right might well be a collective procedure for quieting title to
personal information.
Conclusion
There may be some value to substituting a property-based
private right of action for the current liability-based regime. Further
benefits might result from leaving that property-based entitlement
somewhat fuzzy. These benefits would be in the form of (1)
enhanced protection of both data privacy and of the residual privacy
commons, (2) allowing public mechanisms to remedy imperfections in
the privacy marketplace, and (3) encouraging the public and private
discussion and articulation of privacy norms. While these benefits
come with unavoidable information and fragmentation costs, these
costs can be minimized by standardizing the muddy rules in particular
contexts, and by creating a collective procedure for quieting title in
personal information.
135. The Leahy Amendment is not unique in its use of an appointed guardian and
judicially supervised bargaining to resolve an anticommons problem. Section 1114 of the
Bankruptcy Code sets forth a procedure for modifying retiree medical benefits in
bankruptcy. Under that section a debtor may modify retiree medical benefits only to the
minimum extent necessary to confirm a plan of reorganization. Retirees, like web site
customers, are a diffuse group. In order to resolve this problem, section 1114 provides for
the appointment of a committee to represent the retirees in any negotiations with the
debtor. If the committee and the debtor are unable to agree on an appropriate
modification of benefits, the bankruptcy court can impose modifications that it thinks are
fair and equitable.
136. A third weakness is its excessive deference to published privacy policies. See
Janger, supra note 2, at 1874-75.

